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TRADABLE PATENT RIGHTS
Ian Ayres* & Gideon Parchomovsky**
Patent thickets may inefficiently retard cumulative innovation. This Article
explores two alternative mechanisms that may be used to weed out patent
thickets. Both mechanisms are intended to reduce the number of patents in our
society. The first mechanism we discuss is price-based regulation of patents
through a system of increasing renewal fees. The second and more innovative
mechanism is quantity-based regulation through the establishment of a system of
Tradable Patent Rights. The formalization of tradable patent rights would
essentially create a secondary market for patent permits in which patent
protection will be bought and sold. The Article then discusses how price and
quantity regulation can be combined to effect superior weeding.
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INTRODUCTION
According to a famous academic anecdote, in the 1960s Ronald Coase was
invited to participate in a panel discussion on pollution. His copanelists (who
since that time have fallen into oblivion) were a radical environmentalist who
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passionately argued that pollution is the worst problem to ever face humanity
and an equally extreme conservative who vehemently denied that pollution
even exists. When it was Coase’s turn to speak, he reportedly slowly turned his
head and said, “I am sure that pollution exists, I know that much; what I do not
know is whether we have enough of it.” 1
A substantially identical question to that which bothered Coase about four
decades ago now preoccupies patent theorists. But, unlike Coase, who did not
know whether we had enough pollution—or, more precisely, enough of the
underlying activities from which pollution results—patent scholars seem to
believe that we have too many patents. Patents are supposed to promote
innovation, and virtually all economists agree that “innovation is the main
driver of economic growth.” 2 But there is a growing concern that the modern
patent system actually chills, not promotes, innovation. In recent years,
aggressive filing patterns by private firms and excessively loose standards of
review at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 3 have
combined to produce an unprecedented proliferation of patents. 4 A particularly
disconcerting result of the increase in the number of patents is the emergence of
patent thickets: multiple patents that cover a single product or technology. 5
Patent thickets can be found in several key industries, such as semiconductors,
biotechnology, computer software, and the Internet. 6
Patent thickets are especially harmful in cumulative innovation settings. In
such settings, the need to secure licenses from multiple patentees, each

1. One of us heard the story from Bruce Lehmann, a former student of Ronald Coase
and currently a professor at the University of California, San Diego, in a presentation he
gave at the Business Method Patents and Financial Services conference that was organized
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in April 2003. The conference program with a link
to an outline of Professor Lehmann’s presentation is available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/
invoke.cfm?objectid=A6BDAC9C-384A-4C59-9096A079D324A9B7&method=display.
2. See, e.g., DAVID WARSH, KNOWLEDGE AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: A STORY OF
ECONOMIC DISCOVERY (2006) (discussing the importance of innovation to economic growth).
3. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
577, 589-90 (1999) (discussing the poor quality of patent applications in terms of the number
and nature of prior art references).
4. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 107 (2003); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner,
Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17 (2005) (“Notwithstanding the high private cost of
patent protection and the relatively low expected value of individual patents, the number of
filings in the U.S. (and worldwide) continues to increase.”). For more specific discussion
that includes figures, see infra Part I.
5. The term “patent thicket” probably originated in the 1970s in a series of cases
involving Xerox’s patents. See Gavin Clarkson, Objective Identification of Patent Thickets:
A Network Analytic Approach (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Business
School) (on file with author).
6. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al.
eds., 2001), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf.

December 2007]

TRADABLE PATENT RIGHTS

865

possessing a veto power over the production of new innovation (1) dramatically
increases bargaining costs between patentees and subsequent innovators; (2)
creates a potential for hold-ups; and (3) lowers the profits of the original
patentees. Patent thickets also harm regular users of patented products and
technology by making it more expensive for users to gain access to the relevant
product or technology.
Economists and legal scholars have advanced various mechanisms to
mitigate the harmful effects of patent thickets. Carl Shapiro has suggested that
cross licensing and patent pools can be effective in reducing patent thickets and
has called for the relaxation of various antitrust doctrines to accommodate
those arrangements. 7 Other economists, such as Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner,
and legal scholars have focused their search on solutions for the USPTO and
recommended various reforms in the standards of patent examination in order
to better screen for valid patents. 8 Finally, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have
called for different application of equitable rules in different industries. 9 This
proposal would lead to a dramatic shortening of patent terms in various
industries, which in turn, would reduce the overall number of valid patents.
In this Article, we seek to explore two alternative mechanisms that may be
used to weed out patent thickets. Both mechanisms are intended to reduce the
number of patents in our society. The first mechanism we discuss is price-based
regulation of patents through a system of renewal fees. Renewal fees are
already being used in the United States and foreign countries. 10 Empirical
studies show that even very modest renewal fees have prompted patentees to
abandon patents, 11 thereby reducing the number of patents with which
subsequent innovators need to contend. The discussion of renewal fees will
therefore focus on ways to improve the workings of the existing system.
The second and more innovative mechanism is quantity-based regulation
through the establishment of a system of tradable patent rights. The
formalization of tradable patent rights will essentially create a secondary
market for patent permits in which patent protection will be bought and sold.
While this proposal may seem at first radical and far-fetched, it should be borne
in mind that a similar system has been implemented in the context of industrial
pollution. 12 The introduction of tradable emission permits for sulfur dioxide
7. Id.
8. E.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 171-72, 178 (2004).
9. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1631-32 (2003); see id. at 1578-79 (suggesting that patent law should be tailored to the needs
of specific industries).
10. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.6 (2007); European Patent Convention art. 86, Oct. 5, 1973,
1065 U.N.T.S. 199.
11. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 14.
12. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1341-42 (1985) (proposing tradable emissions permits as an alternative

866

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:863

(SO2) in the 1990 Amendments to Title VI of the Clean Air Act resulted in a
dramatic improvement in air quality and is viewed by economists and
environmentalists alike as a success story. Furthermore, it is widely believed
that the use of tradable permits can solve other environmental problems such as
depletion of ocean fisheries. 13 Tradable rights systems induce actors to behave
in a more socially desirable fashion by imposing quantity limits and inducing
voluntary rights transfers from less efficient to more efficient users.
A similar mechanism may be adopted to reduce the “informational haze”
produced by patent thickets. Policymakers can set a cap on the overall number
of patents 14 —or, more precisely, the overall number of years of patent
protection—and institute a system of tradable patent rights. Doing so will
induce holders of low-value patents to sell their rights to higher value
inventors, thereby improving the efficiency of the entire patent system.
Likewise, such a system will prompt new patentees to purchase the right
amount of protection. Patentees will be able to acquire one, five, or fifteen
years of protection depending on the commercial success of their inventions.
Valueless patents will be abandoned, clearing the path for newer, more
valuable inventions. Over time, this process will weed out patent thickets, as
valueless and low-value patents are relinquished.
Implementation of the proposed solution will effect a dramatic shift in the
existing patent system. While patentees will continue to submit their
applications to the review of the USPTO, approval will no longer mean an
automatic fixed term of twenty years. Instead, successful applicants will need
to purchase tradable patent licenses either from the USPTO or on the secondary
market and will be able to tailor the protection term to their specific needs. 15
The price of the protection will be determined by the forces of supply and
demand, not by administrative fiat.
The remainder of the Article consists of three parts. Part I discusses the
burgeoning phenomenon of patent thickets and its adverse effect on innovation.
Part II explains how price- and quantity-based regulation may arrest the
development of patent thickets. We first assess each of the mechanisms on a
stand-alone basis and then consider the possibility of combining them in order
to achieve optimal weeding. Part III addresses the issue of implementation by

to command-and-control regulation).
13. See discussion infra Part II.B.
14. Admittedly, determining what the cap should be is a difficult task. In this sense, the
analogy between industrial pollution and patents is imperfect. In the context of industrial
pollution, the cap was set based on careful environmental research. There is no analogous
way to determine the desirable quantity of patents. We have not yet figured out a way to
measure the optimal level of innovation in our society. In this Article, we use the current
level of patent protection, i.e., the total number of patent years, as the baseline cap. Of
course, this number might prove too high or too low but over time it may be adjusted
through a process of trial and error.
15. See discussion infra Part III.
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proposing a way to introduce a tradable patent rights regime. A short
conclusion follows.
I. PATENT THICKETS AND THEIR COSTS
This Part explores the burgeoning phenomenon of patent thickets and its
adverse effect on innovation. It then surveys the academic responses to the
problem.
A. Patent Thickets
Recent years have seen a dramatic change in patent scholarship.
Traditionally, patent scholarship focused, by and large, on the price effects of
patent protection. The main problem theorists noted was that patent protection
allowed patentees to engage in supracompetitive pricing, generating a social
deadweight loss. This line of analysis suggested that patent protection involves
a fundamental tradeoff between dynamic and static efficiency: patents spur
innovation but only at the cost of distorted pricing. The normative challenge,
therefore, was to design policy mechanisms that would minimize the market
power of certain patentees without unduly diminishing research and
development (R&D) incentives. 16
Through time, patent theorists gradually turned their attention away from
static to dynamic efficiency costs. That is, they adjusted their focus away from
the deadweight loss generated by patent protection and shifted it to a different
problem: the chilling effect of patents on innovation. The dramatic growth in
the number of issued patents has prompted a concern that the modern patent
system hinders technological progress, and hence retards dynamic efficiency.
In particular, the desire of patentees to build strong patent portfolios, coupled
with the poor quality of review by the USPTO and the laxity with which it

16. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115,
122-24 (2003) (suggesting ways to improve the workings of patent prizes); Ian Ayres & Paul
Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The
Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 987
(1999) (proposing a system of probabilistic patents to limit patentees’ market power);
Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON.
1137, 1147-48 (1998) (describing an auction mechanism that allows for the compensation of
inventors without creating deadweight loss); Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why
the Government Should Subsidize the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 123, 124-25 (1997) (explaining how awarding subsidies to users of pharmaceutical
drugs can reduce the deadweight loss associated with patent protection);
Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44
J.L. & ECON. 525, 525-29 (2001) (discussing the possibility of replacing intellectual property
rights with a system of rewards).
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grants patents, have dramatically increased the cost of follow-on innovation in
our society. 17
Between 1990 and 2003, the number of U.S. filings more than doubled
from 176,264 to 366,043, and the number of issued patents grew from 99,077
to 187,015. 18 Importantly, the dramatic rise in the number of filings and patent
grants is not fully attributable to greater investments in R&D. Rather, it stems
in large part from a conscious effort by firms to maximize the number of
patents per R&D dollar. 19 The case of IBM is illustrative. From 1994 to 2003,
IBM received a total of 24,685 U.S. patents, 20 setting new records for the most
U.S. patents received in a single year, 21 despite the fact that over the same
period IBM slashed its research budget. 22 As befits an industry leader, IBM set

17. See generally Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent
U.S. Patent Reform, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 147 (2002) (reviewing the literature and
suggesting that poorer review standards induce the creation of patent thickets).
18. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT AND STATISTICS CHART
CALENDAR YEARS 1963-2006 (2007), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/
us_stat.htm.
19. To be sure, total R&D expenditures have grown even more dramatically in recent
years. See SUMIYE OKUBO ET AL., BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, R&D SATELLITE ACCOUNT:
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES A-30 tbl.4.2 (2006), available at http://www.bea.gov/rd/xls/
1959_2002_rd_data.xls (showing a 133% rise in real R&D investment over the period 1990
to 2002). The fact that R&D investment has outpaced growth in patent grants is not
inconsistent with the proposition that firms are maximizing patents per dollar. Instead, these
data likely also reflect an increase in the cost of R&D. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The
Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151,
168 tbl.4 (2003) (finding an annual increase of 7.4% of drug development costs from 19801990). Our point here is that we would expect R&D expenditure growth to outpace growth in
patent grants even more in the absence of patent thickets.
20. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Releases Annual List
of Top 10 Organizations Receiving Most U.S. Patents (Jan. 12, 2004) (on file with authors);
Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Releases Annual List of Top 10
Organizations Receiving Most U.S. Patents (Jan. 13, 2003) (on file with authors); Press
Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Releases Annual List of Top 10
Organizations Receiving Most U.S. Patents (Jan. 10, 2002) (on file with authors); Press
Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Releases Annual List of 10 Organizations
Receiving Most Patents (Jan. 10, 2001) (on file with authors); Press Release, U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, IBM Repeats of PTO’s Annual List of 10 Organizations Receiving Most
Patents (Jan. 11, 2000) (on file with authors); Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, IBM Repeats at Top of PTO’s Annual List of 10 Organizations Receiving Most
Patents (Jan. 8, 1999) (on file with authors); Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
USPTO Announces Top Patent Earners (Jan. 12, 1998) (on file with authors); Press Release,
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Announces Last Year’s Top Patent Earners (Jan.
21, 1997) (on file with authors); Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO
Press Release on Top Patent Earners (Jan. 30, 1996) (on file with authors); History of IBM,
1994, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/history/year_1994.html; see also Parchomovsky
& Wagner, supra note 4, at 46 n.147.
21. Press Release, IBM, IBM Breaks U.S. Patent Record (Jan. 12, 2004), available at
http://www-03.ibm.com/industries/education/doc/content/news/pressrelease/
992547110.html.
22. See Robert Buderi, Into the Big Blue Yonder, TECH. REV., July-Aug. 1999, at 48.
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the standard for other companies. Realizing the importance of elaborate patent
holdings, firms began to seek patents on various aspects of the same product or
technology. For example, the technology underlying Adobe’s Acrobat Reader
6.0 is protected by as many as forty-one different patents (which you can see
scroll by each time the software loads). Worse yet, some companies adopted
the practice of “patent flooding,” which entails filing dozens, sometimes
hundreds, of applications on every conceivable improvement on a broad basic
invention patented by a rival company. 23
Responsibility for the explosion of patents does not fall exclusively on
patentees; the USPTO also shoulders part of the blame. A careful examination
process might have curbed the filing frenzy. Unfortunately, the USPTO’s
review of patent applications is anything but comprehensive; scholars who
studied the USPTO expressed great concern about the quality of review of
patent applications by the USPTO. The main findings were that the USPTO is
both underfunded and understaffed. On average, patent examiners spend only
eighteen hours on each application. Moreover, due to the reward structure in
the USPTO, examiners have a clear financial incentive to approve applications
they review. As a result, dubious applications that should have been rejected
often pass muster with the USPTO. 24 Overwhelmed by the rising tide of
filings, the USPTO has failed to perform adequately its gatekeeping duties and
thereby contributed to the proliferation of patents.
B. The Cost of Patent Thickets
The proliferation of patents is not without a cost. The aggressive pursuit of
patents over any innovation, large or small, has given rise to the phenomenon
of “patent thickets.” A patent thicket occurs when a technology or a product is
covered by multiple patents that are often held by numerous patentees. 25 To see
why patent thickets chill innovation, it is first necessary to understand the
nature of technological progress. Innovation in most technological sectors is a
cumulative process. As Joseph Stiglitz observed, “[W]e have an innovation
system in which one innovation builds on another.” 26 In our system, new
inventors have the benefit of the insights made by their predecessors. But
23. This practice was common in Japan. Sri Krishna Sankaran, Patent Flooding in the
United States and Japan, 40 IDEA 393, 393-94 (2000).
24. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997) (claiming one-click
online shopping); U.S. Patent No. 6,289,319 (filed Nov. 30, 1994) (claiming online credit
card payments); U.S. Patent No. 5,715,314 (filed Oct. 24, 1994) (claiming online shopping
carts).
25. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 119. Shapiro defines a patent thicket as “a dense web of
overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to
actually commercialize new technology.” Id. at 120.
26. Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based Competition Before Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Case No. P951201 (1995), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/
GC101295.shtm.
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enlightenment comes at a price. Patents confer on their holders property rule
protection, namely, the power to exclude others from the underlying invention.
Any person who wishes to improve upon a patented invention must either
secure permission from the patentee or risk harsh consequences.
In a sense, the problems created by patent thickets are not completely new.
The patent system grants property rights to patent holders, allowing them to
prevent the use of their patent by future innovators. In the past, overbroad
patents held by a single individual have had the effect of stifling innovation.
For example, in 1895 George Selden was issued a patent for his “Road
Engine,” 27 which included the already common concept of placing a gasoline
engine on a chassis to create a car. Selden’s patent was enforced against upstart
automakers for sixteen years before being narrowed by a court, and the patent
stifled the production and development of automobiles during that time. 28
Selden’s vigorous enforcement strategy demonstrates the power that a single,
well-situated patent holder can exercise over the development of an entire
industry. The modern patent thicket phenomenon has the potential to grant that
same power to many different patent holders, all of whom may control
exclusive rights to integral pieces of innovation. Patent thickets already pervade
several key industries in our economy, including biotechnology, 29
nanotechnology, 30 computer software, and the Internet. 31
Computer software and the Internet have suffered the most so far.
Computer programming has very low barriers to entry when compared to
traditional businesses and especially high-tech fields like nanotechnology or
biotechnology. Major developments in computer science often occur quickly
and are spearheaded by heretofore unknown businesses with relatively little
capital. 32 The software industry also tends to progress on an incremental and
cumulative basis; 33 it is rare and expensive to develop completely original
software. Additionally, the USPTO has become more willing to grant patents

27. U.S. Patent No. 549,160 (filed May 8, 1879) (issued Nov. 5, 1895).
28. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 3 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
29. See id., ch. 3, at 29 (concluding that the proliferation of biotechnology patents may
hinder future innovation).
30. Since most nanotechnology is not yet commercially viable, there has not been
significant litigation regarding overlapping patents so far. However, the pattern of patenting
in nanotechnology closely resembles other fields that are experiencing patent thickets, and
some commentators fear that it is only a matter of time before the issue arises in
nanotechnology. See, e.g., Liz Gannes, Nanotech Patents Proliferate, RED HERRING, Apr.
20, 2005, http://www.redherring.com/Home/11866.
31. See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 120-21.
32. The success stories of Microsoft and Google are two of many such examples in the
software field.
33. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 28, ch. 3, at 44-45.
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for “business methods,” which often incorporate simple ideas already in
widespread use and are difficult to invent around or otherwise avoid. 34
As a result, many software companies find it next to impossible to operate
without some form of patent infringement. One member of the software
industry undertook a search for existing patents relevant to his business and
identified 120 that appeared to overlap and upon which his company was
infringing. 35 Others have been reluctant to even undertake such a search, for
fear that knowledge of the existing patents would leave them open to
willfulness claims and significantly increased damages in the event of future
litigation. 36
The situation in the semiconductor industry is not much better. As Jaffe
and Lerner report: “The problem with patents in this industry is that there is so
much overlap among the technologies developed by different companies that it
is difficult to bring any product to market without potentially infringing patents
held by other companies.” 37
When a technology is covered by multiple patents, the improver “must
hack its way through [the patent thicket] in order to actually commercialize
new technology.” 38 In this case, an improver must obtain permission from all
relevant patentees. Alternatively, the improver can try to invent around all the
relevant patents and thereby avoid the need to negotiate permissions. Finally,
the improver can ignore all pre-existing patents, go ahead and commercialize
her innovation, and expose herself, ex post, to multiple patent infringement
suits. 39
Securing permission from all relevant right holders involves two types of
costs: information costs and negotiation costs. To secure the licenses necessary
to produce the improvement, an improver must first obtain information about
all blocking patents and their holders. In other words, she must identify the
relevant patents that comprise the thicket and determine who owns them. This
would require the improver to pore over numerous patents, determine their
validity, and assess their scope. Since the language of patent claims is often
technical and vague, the foregoing tasks may require the hiring of one or more
34. See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 120-21. These “business method” patents have gone
as far as to include a patent granted to Sightsound.com for the sale of downloadable music or
video over the Internet. Id.
35. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 28, ch. 3, at 52; cf. James Bessen & Robert M.
Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents 4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Working
Papers Research Dep’t, Working Paper No. 03-17/R, 2004) (reporting that the increase in
patent filings in the software industry is positively correlated with a decline in investment in
R&D). But see Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?,
83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 999-1009 (2005) (suggesting that intense patenting in the industry does
not stifle research and that patents actually help small firms).
36. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 28, ch. 3, at 49.
37. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 8, at 59.
38. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 120.
39. Id. at 125.
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legal or technical experts. Unfortunately, even a very careful review of all
issued patents would not completely protect the intended innovator from the
threat of infringement suits because many pending patent applications are not
available to the public. The USPTO publishes patent applications eighteen
months after their filing, 40 and until that time the public is kept in the dark
about their content. As a result, regardless of their investment in information,
follow-on innovators are always exposed to some risk of inadvertent
infringements.
After reviewing all publicly available patents, the improver can either
negotiate licenses from the owner or design around the pre-existing patents.
Consider the negotiation option first. As Carl Shapiro has pointed out, patent
thickets present a classic complements problem. 41 Since each patent holder has
a property right in a key input and the improver needs to produce her
innovation, the improver must purchase licenses from all the patent holders.
Each patent holder may thus be viewed as a monopolist who controls an input
necessary for the production of the improvement.
Even if one sets aside for the moment the problem of strategic behavior, a
simple numeric example can illustrate how the need to secure multiple licenses
can stifle follow-on innovation. Suppose that a follow-on innovator
contemplates a new product that is expected to yield a profit of $500, net of
R&D costs. To produce the product, the innovator must invest $120 to search
for pre-existing patents and then secure licenses from twenty different
patentees. The cost of every negotiation process is $5, and the license fee is
$15. Given that the cost of securing the necessary permissions ($520) exceeds
the expected return on the investment ($500), the cumulative innovation will
not be produced and society will be deprived of a valuable product.
Worse yet, when a manufacturer must purchase two key inputs from two
different monopolists, the resulting price would be higher than the price that
would prevail if the two inputs were controlled and sold by a single monopolist
firm. Shapiro posits that this same double-markup problem applies “when
multiple companies control blocking patents for a particular product, process,
or business method.” 42 Hence, cumulative innovators who face a patent thicket
will pay higher license fees. On the margin, the higher fees may not leave
enough profits to justify the investment in the innovation.
Finally, economic theory predicts that negotiations between cumulative
innovators and patentees will be plagued by holdout problems. Each patent
holder can block the new innovation by withholding consent and thus can ask
for the entire expected value of the new innovation in exchange for her consent.
Furthermore, due to information asymmetries, the asking price of patentees

40. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2000) (requiring the PTO, subject to a few narrow
exceptions, to publish a patent application eighteen months after its filing date).
41. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 123.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
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may be higher than the actual value of the innovation. If the cumulative
innovator cannot invent around any of the relevant patents, even one holdout
case is sufficient to stop the new innovation from being produced.
The holdout problem generated by patent thickets is a mere instance of a
general problem in property theory. As Michael Heller pointed out, when
multiple, dispersed property rights cover a resource, the resource will be
underused. 43 In a subsequent contribution, Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg
applied that basic insight to biotechnological research. They argued that the
proliferation of blocking patents in that area causes underuse of basic research
findings and generates “a tragedy of the anticommons.” 44
The problem of patent thickets also explains why the proliferation of even
relatively low-value patents imposes social costs. One might initially suppose
that the proliferation of patent grants is unproblematic because only a small
fraction of patents have any significant social economic value. 45 Since most
patents are worthless, you might think that no one would bother to infringe. But
the patent thicket argument shows that even probabilistically worthless patents
can do social harm. Low-value patents in the midst of a patent thicket can still
stifle future innovation. An improver must innovate around a blocking patent or
negotiate with its holder even if the patent, standing alone, has no economic
value. 46 Moreover, the possibility of holdout creates incentives for inventors to
obtain and maintain blocking patents that have low intrinsic value for the
purpose of positioning themselves to take advantage of negotiations with future
innovators. These blocking patents thus remain obstacles to future innovation
and impose social costs despite their low economic value.
Renewal fees or the cost of acquiring tradable patent permits can usefully
weed the thicket of blocking patents. Imagine in the foregoing example that the
twenty patents were initially acquired solely for their blocking potential, and at
the time of initial acquisition their blocking potential varied from five to ten
percent. Renewal fees will not deter acquisition of patents with sufficiently
high probability of blocking. If there is a 100% chance that patenting today will
give rise to a subsequent licensing fee from a follow-on innovator, the initial
inventor is still likely to patent even if the only profit is from a blocking
license. But renewal or permit fees will deter the low-probability or marginal
patents. An initial patentee with only a five or ten percent chance of being paid
43. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622-23 (1998).
44. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998).
45. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1495, 1507 (2001) (estimating that only five percent of issued patents are licensed for a
royalty); see also Steven C. Carlson, Note, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16
YALE J. ON REG. 359, 385 (1999) (“Most infringed patents are not worth defending in court .
. . . Even in the pharmaceutical industry, where patents are most valuable, eight out of ten
patents typically produce no value for their holders.”).
46. See Shapiro, supra note 6, at 120.
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by a follow-on innovator will be much less likely to pay the price of the
renewal or permit fee. The follow-on innovator (and society) wins because the
costs of negotiation and failed holdouts are reduced.
While economists and legal scholars debate the prevalence of holdouts in
actual cumulative innovation settings, 47 it should be noted that even if in the
real world patentees rarely stop cumulative innovators dead in their tracks by
withholding consent, the potential for holdouts increases transaction costs for
cumulative innovators. Depending on the profit margin, this increase may cause
the cumulative innovator to forego the new innovation. Furthermore, the
potential for holdouts may deter innovators from assaying to produce the new
innovation.
Instead of negotiating with multiple patentees, cumulative innovators can
try to invent around the patent thicket. In many cases, however, inventing
around may prove impossible or as costly as negotiating. First, while inventing
around substitutes for negotiation, it does not lower information costs.
Inventing around requires a careful study of the patents around which the new
innovation is to be designed. Second and more importantly, it would often be
impracticable or not cost-effective to invent around patent thickets. Inventing
around a patent thicket would often require a new technological or conceptual
breakthrough that most innovators are incapable of achieving. 48
Of course, cumulative innovators can adopt a mixed strategy of inventing
around certain patents while licensing others. It is far from clear, however, that
this mixed strategy would improve their lot. To begin with, the need to
negotiate reintroduces the potential for holdouts. Moreover, the combined cost
of inventing around and negotiating may render the new innovation unworthy
of commercializing. Finally, in contrast to licensing, inventing around a patent
leaves cumulative innovators exposed to the risk of litigation. Litigation may
arise either because the effort to invent around was not completely successful

47. For articles suggesting that the problem is very real and acute, see, for example,
Shapiro, supra note 6; Gregory J. Glover, Patent Thickets and Innovation Markets Reviewed,
26 NAT’L L.J., Oct. 14, 2002, at C10; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 44; Bessen & Hunt,
supra note 35; James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies
(Research on Innovation, Working Paper No. 0401, 2004); Robert Hunt, When Do More
Patents Reduce R&D? (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Working Papers Research Dep’t,
Working Paper No. 06-6, 2006). For the opposite view, see Richard A. Epstein, Steady the
Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE
HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 153, 166-68 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003); and John P. Walsh, Ashish
Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical
Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 285 (Wesley M. Cohen &
Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
48. But see Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical
Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 663 (2004) (“By raising the cost of ‘doing science’ within an
established paradigm, however, patents encourage scientists to create alternate theories of
how natural phenomena operate, theories whose investigation does not depend on using
patented research tools.”).
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or because of strike suits by opportunistic patentees who enjoy relative cost
advantages in litigation.
Kodak’s attempt to invent around Polaroid’s patent provides a striking
example of the risk inherent in this strategy. For years, Polaroid controlled the
instant camera market. In order to solidify its market position the firm acquired
multiple patents on its inventions. In 1969 Kodak decided to enter the instant
camera market. Kodak consciously decided that it would not infringe any of
Polaroid’s patents. To this end, Kodak worked closely with its patent attorney
in order to develop a technology that gets around Polaroid’s patents. After
years of preparations, in 1986 Kodak entered the market. A week later it was
sued by Polaroid for multiple patent infringements. The legal battle between the
two companies took years and ended tragically for Kodak. Despite its best
efforts, Kodak was held liable for seven patent infringements. The court issued
an injunction against the company, forcing it to shut down its plant and lay off
employees, which Kodak had argued would cause the company to lose
hundreds of millions of dollars. 49
In principle, cumulative innovators have another option still: they can
simply ignore all blocking patents, commercialize the new innovation, and deal
with infringement suits after the fact. This option is the least desirable of all. By
sinking money into the commercialization of an infringing product, the
cumulative innovator only makes herself an easier prey for patent holders.
After an innovation has been commercialized and put to a large-scale
production, patentees can seek far greater royalty fees by threatening to shut
down production. 50 Hence, only cumulative innovators who can fend off
litigation may consider adopting this course of action. Most cumulative
innovators, however, cannot afford to take the risk. 51
The adverse effects of patent thickets are not limited to follow-on
innovators. Patent thickets also lower the returns of the patentees whose patents
compose the thickets. Complementary monopolies not only raise prices for
downstream manufacturers but also lower the profits of the monopolists
themselves. 52 In cumulative innovation settings, this result is not surprising.
Patentees’ return on innovation depends in part on the licensing fees they
collect from follow-on innovators and consumers. As we explained, when a
technology or a product gets entangled in a patent thicket, the cost of using it
goes up and licensing fees go down. Consequently, the emergence of a patent

49. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 8, at 113-14.
50. The threat is credible in this case as injunctive relief is a standard remedy for
patent infringement. See id. at 111 (“Perhaps the most dramatic way in which the [Federal
Circuit] has strengthened the remedies available to patentees is the availability of
preliminary injunctive relief.”).
51. For an analysis of litigation trends in patent law, see Parchomovsky & Wagner,
supra note 4, at 63-64.
52. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 123.
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thicket might prevent original patentees from recouping their investment in
innovation. Thus, patent thickets put a drag on all levels of innovation.
Finally, patent thickets also harm users of patented products and
technologies. Not only do patent thickets raise the cost of certain patented
products and technologies to consumers but they also create uncertainty as to
the legal rights in such products and technologies. When a technology is
covered by a single patent, the licensor is readily identifiable. When, on the
other hand, a technology is covered by multiple patents that are held by
multiple patentees, potential users find themselves in a bind. They can either try
to navigate the patent thickets in an attempt to sort out which patentees should
be contacted or simply obtain licenses from all the patentees who staked a
claim to the technology. Per our earlier discussion, it should be clear that either
option implicates a considerable cost.
C. Extant Academic Responses
The problem of patent thickets has not escaped the attention of theorists.
Academics have proposed several ways to mitigate the harm occasioned by
patent thickets. As always, these proposals may be divided into two broad
categories: ex post solutions and ex ante solutions. Generally, the ex post
solutions contemplate various transactional mechanisms that would induce
more cooperative behavior and sharing of patent rights. In an influential article,
Shapiro argued that cross licensing and patent pools are “natural and effective
methods . . . to cut through the patent thicket.” 53 Accordingly, he recommended
that our antitrust laws be relaxed to accommodate these currently illegal
arrangements. 54
The ex ante solutions, by contrast, focus on the need to change the process
and standards by which patents are granted. Perturbed by the ease with which
patents are granted, some scholars have argued for a substantive reform of the
USPTO and the introduction of a more rigid examination process. In a recent
article, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley proposed a different mode of intervention
that targets patent terms. In particular, they called for the abolition of the
current uniform protection term and its replacement with a differential
protection term that is tailored to specific industry needs. Accordingly, software
patents will receive a relatively short protection term while pharmaceutical

53. Id. at 119.
54. Id.; see also Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions:
The Case of Patent Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 123 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus et al. eds.,
2001); Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and
Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1997, at 8;
Josh Lerner, Jean Tirole & Marcin Strojwas, Cooperative Market Agreements Between
Competitors: Evidence from Patent Pools (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 9680, 2003).
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patents will get a longer protection term. But while the protection term will
vary among industries (or technological sectors), all patents in the same
industry will receive the same protection term. 55
In the remainder of the Article, we wish to contribute to the burgeoning
academic exchange by examining two alternative methods of intervention that
can help thin patent thickets. The first is regulation of patent “prices” through a
system of patent renewal fees; the second is quantity-based regulation that
seeks to establish a market for patents through the introduction of tradable
patent rights (TPRs).
II. PRICES V. QUANTITIES
Part I established the case for weeding out patent thickets. This Part asks:
what is the best means of reducing the number of patents that are in effect?
Perhaps the most obvious means of reducing the number of patents would be to
heighten the requirements for patentability—for example, requiring more in the
way of non-obvious improvement over the prior art. 56 But instead of relying on
the judgments of patent examiners ex ante or judges ex post, it is possible to
economize on the private information of the patentees to weed out the patents
that are expected to have the least value. We first discuss how a system of
renewal fees could accomplish such weeding. The current system of renewal
fees that is in place in virtually all countries already accomplish some weeding
by shortening the practical life of a majority of all issued patents. We then turn
to the question of whether a system of tradable permits might accomplish the
weeding in a more efficient manner.
A. Using Renewal Fees to Weed the Thicket
While many think of patents as having a fixed twenty-year term, the reality
is that patentees have to repeatedly pay renewal fees to keep their patents
effective over the full twenty years. These “maintenance” or “renewal” fees are
required in virtually every country. The United States requires patentees to pay
maintenance fees at three different points during the twenty-year term if they
wish to preserve the validity of their patent:
Three and a half years after issuance, a patentee must pay $900 or the patent
will expire at the four year point. Seven and a half years after issuance, the
patentee must pay $2,300 or the patent will expire at the eight year point, and
eleven and a half years after issuance, the patentee must pay $3,800 or the

55. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1634, 1638-40.
56. See, e.g., John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 492 (2003) (suggesting
that the non-obviousness standard should be raised in certain industies); cf. Robert M. Hunt,
Nonobviousness and the Incentive to Innovate: An Economic Analysis of Intellectual
Property Reform 37-38 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Research Dep’t, Working Paper No.
99-3, 1999) (proposing different non-obviousness standards for different industries).
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patent will expire at the twelve year point. Even though there is a uniform
patent term for all patents (twenty years from the date of the application),
renewal fees create a de facto differentiation in patent terms. 57

As economist Ariel Pakes long ago observed, a patentee can be seen as
having an option to tailor the duration of the patent length. 58
In other countries, the payment of renewal fees tends to occur annually. For
example, a twenty-year European patent has renewal fees that have to be paid
from the third patent year onwards to maintain protection. A twenty-year
Japanese patent has the first three year’s renewal fees paid together, and for
subsequent annual fees, “the applicant can pay either yearly or in advance.” 59
Figure 1. Maintenance of Patents Granted by Trilateral Offices
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The fees are relatively small and tend to be calibrated to covering some of
the costs of operating the respective country’s patent offices. 60 In Japan, for

57. Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1525-26
(2005) (citations omitted); see 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)-(g) (2007). The maintenance fees for
small entities are half these amounts. Id. If a patent expires due to non-payment of
maintenance fees, it can be reissued within twenty-four months if the patentee pays a
surcharge of $700 or $1640 and convinces the USPTO that the late payment was
unavoidable or unintentional. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.378 (2003); id. § 1.20(h). The United States
did not charge maintenance fees prior to 1982.
58. Ariel Pakes, Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European
Patent Stocks, 54 ECONOMETRICA 755, 756 (1986).
59. TRILATERAL CO-OPERATION, TRILATERAL STATISTICAL REPORT: 2005 EDITION 39
(2006), available at http://www.trilateral.net/tsr/tsr_2005/tsr2005.pdf.
60. See Joshua S. Gans, Stephen P. King & Ryan Lampe, 4 TOPICS IN THEORETICAL
ECON. 1 (2004), available at http://www.bepress.com/bejte/topics/vol4/iss1/art6.
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example, the renewal fees for the fourth to the sixth year are only $74 plus
$5.48 per patent claim; for the seventh to ninth year, they are $222 plus $17.36
per claim. For the tenth to the twentieth year, they are $742 and $58.49 per
claim. 61
Nonetheless, these rather modest renewal fees have been quite successful
in reducing the effective life of patents. Figure 1 shows that a large proportion
of granted patents in the United States, Europe, and Japan are not maintained
for their entire twenty-year life. 62
In the United States, more than 50% of all patents are not maintained after
fourteen years. The median life of European patents is twelve years, and the
median life for Japanese patents is just nine years. At the end of twenty years,
less than 10% of European and Japanese patents and less than 40% of U.S.
patents are still in effect. 63
The impact of the rather modest renewal fees on effective patent life has
been exploited by economists in a number of ways. Empiricists have used the
willingness of patentees to exercise (or not exercise) their continuation options
to estimate the distribution of patent values—or more precisely, the distribution
of values for patent protection. 64 Since, as noted previously, even these modest
renewal fees cause most patentees to relinquish their patents, it is not surprising
that the median value of patents (or more precisely, of patent protection) is
often estimated to be less than $10,000. 65 These numbers have also been used
to produce better estimates of the number of patents that are in effect, as well as
“value-weighted” patent counts. 66 An analysis of renewal rates can therefore
61. See Japan Patent Office: Schedule of Fees, http://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/
index.htm. These prices derive from fees listed in Yen by the Japan Patent Office using the
November 12, 2007, exchange rate of $1 to ¥109.42.
62. This figure is reproduced from TRILATERIAL CO-OPERATION, TRILATERAL
STATISTICAL REPORT: 2006 EDITION 41 fig.4.8 (2007), available at http://www.trilateral.net/
tsr/tsr_2006/tsr_2006.pdf. The underlying data is available at http://www.trilateral.net/tsr/
tsr_2006/annex/ 2006_web_annex.xls.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Ariel Pakes & Mark Schankerman, The Rate of Obsolescence of Patents,
Research Gestation Lags, and the Private Rate of Return to Research Resources, in R & D,
PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY 73, 73-74 (Zvi Griliches ed., 1984); Jean Olson Lanjouw,
Patent Protection in the Shadow of Infringement: Simulation Estimations of Patent Value, 65
REV. ECON. STUD. 671, 671 (1998); Pakes, supra note 58, at 755; Mark Schankerman, How
Valuable Is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77, 77
(1998); Mark Schankerman & Ariel Pakes, Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in
European Countries During the Post-1950 Period, 96 ECON. J. 1052, 1052 (1986); Jean O.
Lanjouw, Ariel Pakes & Jonathan Putnam, How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual
Property: Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 5741, 1996).
65. Schankerman, supra note 64, at 93 (concluding that the median private value of
patent rights, in 1980 dollars, amounted to only $1631 in the pharmaceutical industry, $1594
in the chemical field, $2930 in the mechanical field, and $3159 in electronics, excluding
Japan).
66. See Lanjouw et al., supra note 64.
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allow us to make progress on the problem that Mark Lemley and Kimberly
Moore have noted:
While we can calculate the number of patents filed before June 8, 1995 which
have yet to expire due to term end, and can therefore get an idea of the
maximum number of potentially enforceable patents (1,300,000), we cannot
calculate the exact number that are still enforceable or the number of potential
submarine patents in that group. 67

Economic theorists in the last decade have also made progress modeling
the potential beneficial uses of renewal fees as a policy tool. Articles by
Suzanne Scotchmer and by Francesca Cornelli and Mark Schankerman have
shown how a patent system with renewal fees can economize on the private
information of patentees. 68 Cornelli and Schankerman, for example, have
shown that a renewal fee system can give patentees with more productive
opportunities the incentive to invest more in R&D. 69 Moreover, their model
suggests how the current structure of patent renewal fees should be modified.
The current structure imposes a regressive tax on patentee profits: low-value
patentees who abandon their patents early, end up paying more than 50% of
their profits as renewal fees, whereas high-value patentees who maintain their
patents for the full term, end up paying less than 5% of their profits as renewal
fees. Cornelli and Schankerman estimate that an optimal structure of patent
renewal fees should have a progressive character: taxing less than 3% of profits
for patents that are low value (and cancelled early), but taxing more than 8% of
expected profits for high-value patents that are renewed to last the entire
twenty-year term. 70
This first generation of articles models static innovation, in which only one
person has a potential idea (no patent races), and there is no possibility of
follow-on innovation. The latter point especially distinguishes their analyses
from the prior Subpart’s argument about the potential usefulness of weeding
the patent thicket so that subsequent inventors retain some room to operate. But
the fact that these articles see the possibility for more rapidly rising renewal
fees in models without the “thicket” problem suggests to us that weeding
strategies may be even more appropriate when we take into account the
problems of follow-on investment.

67. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84
B.U. L. REV. 63, 84 n.81 (2004).
68. Francesca Cornelli & Mark Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives,
30 RAND J. ECON. 197, 197-98 (1999); Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Optimality of the Patent
Renewal System, 30 RAND J. ECON. 181, 181 (1999).
69. Cornelli & Schankerman, supra note 68, at 198 (“[D]ifferentiated patent lives can
be welfare improving because of an ‘incentive effect’: allowing firms with high R&D
capabilities to choose longer patent lives gives these firms an incentive to invest more R&D
resources.”).
70. Id. at 208 fig.3.

December 2007]

TRADABLE PATENT RIGHTS

881

B. Should Government Choose the Quantity Instead of the Price?
While renewal fees certainly have reduced the number of patents that are in
effect over time, this same effect could be accomplished by a license system in
which the number of licenses that were in effect was limited and patentees had
to acquire a patent as well as a license in order to have an effective patent.
The concept of tradable permits has long been a favorite of economists and
has begun to gain traction with policy makers and academics. A tradable permit
system can lead to the more efficient allocation of resources by allowing
resources to flow to their highest value users. Such market-based systems have
been implemented successfully in several arenas, most notably in air pollution
control and in commercial fishing licenses.
Title IV of the the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act included a
national tradable permit system for SO2 emissions. 71 Permits are granted to
producers of SO2 based on their prior production levels, and at the end of each
year, each producer must hold enough permits to cover their emission of SO2.
Additional permits may be banked (or carried over) for the next year or sold to
other producers or third parties. 72 This tradable system allows for companies
who can reduce their emissions at low cost to sell their excess SO2 permits to
companies who bear a higher cost of reduction. In the fifteen years since this
system was put into place, there is evidence that it has been highly effective:
SO2 emissions were reduced by nearly thirty percent beyond the required level,
and compliance with the program has been almost perfect. 73 Additionally, the
tradable permits program has been estimated to create a cost saving of sixteen
to twenty-five percent relative to a uniform emissions standard for SO2. 74
These cost savings are less than some supporters hoped for when a marketbased permit program was first proposed, 75 but the program has generally been
considered a success.
Commercial fishing is a second industry that has benefited from the use of
tradable permits. Commercial fishing is a textbook tragedy of the commons
problem, in which every fisherman has the incentive to catch as many fish as
possible, thereby leading to overfishing. This drives down prices in the
marketplace and reduces the stock of fish in the wild, leading to endangerment
or even extinction of certain species of fish. An estimated seventy percent of
the world’s fish species are now either fully exploited or depleted, and intense

71. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 122
(2005).
72. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE EPA ACID RAIN PROGRAM 3
(1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/ docs/1999report.pdf.
73. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 71, at 122.
74. Nathaniel O. Keohane, What Did the Market Buy? Cost Savings Under the U.S.
Tradeable Permits Program for Sulfur Dioxide 23 (Yale Ctr. for Envtl. Law and Policy,
Working Paper No. ES-33, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=465320.
75. Id. at 22-23 (noting that prior estimates anticipated even greater cost savings).
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competition for the remaining fish creates economic waste. 76 The traditional
government response to overfishing has been intense regulation of many
aspects of the fishing industry, which has proven costly to enforce and still
provides incentives for fishermen to search for loopholes and increase their
own catch. 77
In response to these continuing problems, new programs of transferable
fishing quotas granted to individual fishermen have been adopted by several
countries, including New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, Canada, and Papua New
Guinea. 78 Much like the pollution permits, these fishing licenses are fully
tradable and ensure that fishing rights flow to those fishermen who can use
them most effectively. Moreover, the programs allow the government to
maintain a strict control on the quantity of fish being caught, thereby
preventing overfishing. This program has been especially successful in New
Zealand, where fish stocks are now healthier and there is evidence of increased
profitability among fishermen. 79
The successes of tradable permit programs in air pollution control and
commercial fishing have led to proposals for tradable permits in many other
fields. Market-based permit concepts are available in fields as widely divergent
as milk production in Canada, 80 red deer hunting in Scotland, 81 and even
wildlife conservation. 82 As tradable permits become more common in different
fields of government action, it is only natural to consider their extension into
patent protection, which is the concern of this Article.
But would a system of tradable patent licenses be superior to a renewal-fee
system? This is a classic “prices vs. quantities” question that has arisen in a
variety of other contexts. 83 Martin Weitzman, in his classic article, Prices vs.
Quantities, noted:

76. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 71, at 123.
77. Id. at 124.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 124-25.
80. See Kevin Chen & Karl Meilke, The Simple Analytics of Transferable Production
Quota: Implications for the Marginal Cost of Ontario Milk Production, 46 CAN. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 37 (1998).
81. See Douglas MacMillan, Tradeable Hunting Obligations—A New Approach to
Regulating Red Deer Numbers in the Scottish Highlands?, 71 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 261, 261
(2004).
82. See Ricardo Bayon, A Bull Market in . . . Woodpeckers?, MILKEN INST. REV., Mar.
2002, at 30, available at http://www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/review/2002_3/
30_39.pdf.
83. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1523 (1984);
William Poole, Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Stochastic
Macro Model, 84 Q.J. ECON. 197, 197 (1970); Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41
REV. ECON. STUD. 477, 477 (1974). Indeed, the analysis and figures of patenting in this Part
closely parallel the analysis of affirmative action quotas and credits found in Ian Ayres,
Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781 (1996).
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From a strictly theoretical point of view there is really nothing to recommend
one mode of control over the other. This notwithstanding, I think it is a fair
generalization to say that the average economist in the Western marginalist
tradition has at least a vague preference toward indirect control by prices, just
as the typical non-economist leans toward the direct regulation of quantities.
...
A reason often cited for the theoretical superiority of prices as planning
instruments is that their use allegedly economizes on information. . . . [I]t is
neither easier nor harder to name the right prices than the right quantities
because in principle exactly the same information is needed to correctly
specify either. 84

Just as Weitzman questioned the “vague preference” that economists have
toward effluent taxes, our purpose here is to show that the preference for
renewal fees is overstated or possibly misplaced. To see why a regime with a
limited number of patent licenses might be superior to a regime with renewal
fees, imagine a one-period model in which a patentee would either have to pay
a single fee in order to make her license active or would have to purchase one
of a limited number of licenses. To implement these regimes, the government
would have to set either a price (a renewal fee) or a quantity (the number of
licenses to be issued).
In a simple model with complete information, the optimal (price or
quantity) regulation would turn on the marginal net private benefits and the
marginal net social costs of patenting. The concept of net private benefits
captures the expected profits from patent protection minus the costs of
producing, prosecuting, and enforcing the patent. The concept of net social
costs refers to all the social costs and benefits of patenting, excluding only the
costs and benefits that accrue to the marginal patentee herself. Society enjoys
many benefits from patenting—including, of course, the way that patent
protection spurs innovation and then makes that innovation common
knowledge. But for the reasons discussed in Part I, there are strong reasons to
expect that a patent thicket that becomes too thick can produce net social costs
that on the margin are higher than the net private benefits to the patentee.
These stylized assumptions are depicted in Figure 2. This figure assumes,
following the logic of Part I, that the marginal net social costs of patenting
(labeled MSC) rise as the quantity of enforceable patents increases. Further,
because of diminishing marginal returns, the private net benefit of the marginal
patent (labeled MPB) declines as the number of enforceable patents grows.
This latter assumption does not mean that the last patent issued in a given time
period is less valuable than the first, but simply that if we arrayed all the patents
issued in, for instance, a year, the least valuable patent is worth less than the
most valuable.
84. Weitzman, supra note 83, at 477-78 (first emphasis added). But see Louis Kaplow
& Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 4 AM. L.
ECON. REV. 1, 1-2 (2002) (acknowledging that Weitzman’s view has been accepted by many
economists but arguing that corrective taxes are a superior way of controlling externalities).
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In simplistic “models” of this kind, social welfare is of course maximized
at the point where the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits. Accordingly,
the government would want to set either the price or the quantity at the point
where the marginal net private benefit to patentees of an additional patent was
set equal to the marginal net social cost of issuing more patents. These amounts
are depicted in Figure 2 as P* and Q*, respectively.
Figure 2. Assessing the “Marginal Social Cost” (MSC) and the “Marginal
Private Benefit” (MPB) of Patents

If the government had complete information about the marginal costs and
benefits of patenting, then either price or quantity regulation would produce an
identical equilibrium. Indeed, with this kind of complete information, the
government could do even better by just offering patent protection to those
ideas that produce a net social benefit and by paying these patentees a lump
sum instead of granting them distortionary monopoly rights. But, as has long
been known, all the important issues of developing optimal intellectual
property rights turn on the government’s imperfect information—or possibly
the question of how best the government might economize on the patentee’s
(and others’) private information. 85
85. See Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and
Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 691-92 (1983). Weitzman made a similar
point:
. . . In an environment of complete knowledge and perfect certainty there is a formal identity
between the use of prices and quantities as planning instruments.
If there is any advantage to employing price or quantity control modes, therefore, it must
be due to inadequate information or uncertainty.

Weitzman, supra note 83, at 480. For a parallel analysis in the affirmative action context, see
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Therefore, to make the price vs. quantity question interesting, we need to
introduce some uncertainty about how patentees will react to a renewal fee as
opposed to a licensing scheme. A marginal net private benefit curve (MPB
curve) can be thought of as the patentees’ reaction function. Its position will
determine, for example, how many patentees will find it worthwhile to pay a
particular licensing fee. To make prices and quantities non-equivalent policy
instruments, imagine that the government is uncertain about the position of the
MPB curve. There are many types of uncertainty that the government might
face, but for one stylized example, assume that the slope of the MPB curve is
known but the intercept with MSC is not known. For stylized concreteness,
imagine that half of the time the MPB curve is shifted up by epsilon and half
the time it is shifted down by epsilon. This uncertainty is depicted in Figure 3
by the dotted lines that are parallel to, but lie above and below, the expected
MPB curve (depicted by the solid line).
Figure 3. An Example in Which Patent Quotas Are Less Efficient than
Renewal Fees

With these assumptions in place, it is possible to explore graphically
whether price or quantity regulation is likely to be more efficient. A more
tailored price or quantity rule would of course depend on the position of the
MPB curve. The optimum patent quantity levels for the two possible states of
the world are depicted in Figure 3 by q*L and q*H, which represent the
quantities where the MSC curve intersects the two possible MPB curves. But
Ayres, supra note 83.
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because of the government’s limited information, simple price or quantity
regulation cannot guarantee the optimum number of patents.
Figure 3 can help us assess how well simple price or quantity regulations
will succeed in tailoring actual patent levels to these optimal benchmarks. The
licensing scheme induces a fixed quantity of enforceable patents with an
equilibrium market price of the license equal to the point where the MPB curve
intersects with the fixed quantity Q*. When the private benefit curve is
unexpectedly low, the quantity regulation induces too much patenting
(Q*>q*L). Under these circumstances, the marginal social cost of patenting at
Q* is epsilon greater than the marginal private benefit. The total inefficiency
caused by this oversupply is represented in Figure 3 by a triangle drawn
between the optimal and actual quantity (labeled B). Because, as Figure 3
indicates, the marginal social cost remains above the marginal private benefit at
all points between q*L and Q*, the triangle area labeled B represents the total
loss in welfare from the quantity regulation’s failure to tailor a lower quantity
when the net private benefits of patenting are unexpectedly low.
Tradable licenses create an analogous inefficiency by inducing too little
patenting when the private benefits of patenting are unexpectedly high. When
the private benefits of patenting are high, the optimum level of patenting (q*H)
is higher than the best level that an imperfectly informed government can
identify (Q*). When this is true, the private benefits of patenting on the margin
at Q* will be greater than the social cost. The inefficiency associated with this
shortfall (between Q* and q*H) is depicted by an analogous triangle (labeled
C).
Figure 3 also shows, however, that a simple price regulation fails to induce
the optimal level of patenting. Quantity regulation is inefficient because the
quantity of patenting does not vary with the strength of private benefits, but
price regulation is inefficient because it causes the quantity of patenting to vary
too much.
When private benefits are unexpectedly low, quantity regulation induces
too much patenting (Q*>q*L), but Figure 3 shows that price regulation induces
too little participation. Patentees responding to a renewal fee cost of P* will
only renew patents up to the point where the marginal private benefit equals the
cost of the renewal. In Figure 3, this renewal point occurs at qRL. But at this
level, the marginal net private benefits of patenting are larger than the marginal
social costs. The inefficiency associated with this shortfall is represented by the
smaller triangle between qRL and q*L (labeled A). An analogous inefficiency
is created when private benefits are unexpectedly high. The price regulation
now induces too much minority participation (qRH > Q*), which is depicted by
an analogous small triangle between q*H and qRH (labeled D).
Comparing the inefficiencies of price and quantity regulations, Figure 3
reveals the conventional result. The fixed-quantity regulation produces a lessnuanced outcome than the price regulation. The price regulation is better
tailored because it produces enforceable patenting levels (qRL and qRH) that
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are closer to the optimal levels (q*L and q*H, respectively). 86 Price regulation
induces more variation in enforceable patenting. And for these assumed
marginal cost and benefit curves, making the level of effective patenting
sensitive to the size of private patent values is more efficient than having the
patenting level be completely invariant.
The residual inefficiency of price regulation is caused by patentees
ignoring the social costs of marginal increases in patenting; they instead only
internalize the constant marginal cost of the renewal fee. But, as drawn in
Figure 3, the externality caused by the flat pricing regulation is relatively small
because the marginal cost curve is itself relatively flat—meaning that under a
price regulation there are slight differences between the marginal costs to
society and the marginal costs imposed by the simple (quantity invariant)
renewal fee.
If the analysis stopped here, there would be little value added by this
economic modeling. Consistent with the current legal embrace of renewal fees,
Figure 3 shows that setting the quantity of tradable licenses is less efficient than
having government set a renewal price. And even though this graph is for a
single price and quantity, one might imagine the same type of graph showing
that a renewal-fee system is clearly preferable to a quota on patent licenses for
each year of a patent’s potential life.
However, it turns out that it is easy to construct examples in which quantity
regulation is more efficient than price regulation. Indeed, if we merely increase
the slope of the social cost curve (MSC), setting the quantity becomes more
efficient than setting the price. Figure 4 shows this possibility.
As before, a system of renewal fees makes the level of effective patenting
more sensitive to the private benefits of patenting. But in this case, the swings
in effective patenting are excessive compared to what optimally tailored (fullinformation) patenting levels would be. The fixed quantity (Q*) is closer to the
full-information optimal levels (q*H and q*L) than are the levels induced by a
simple renewal fee (qRH and qRL). The deviations from the optimal level of
effective patenting create analogous inefficiencies for price and quantity
regulations, but in Figure 4, the inefficiency of renewal fees is greater than that
for a fixed licensing quantity.

86. Graphically, q*L - qRL < Q* - q*L and qRH - q*H < q*H - Q*.
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Figure 4. An Example in Which Renewal Fees Are Less
Efficient than Patent Quotas

This geometry suggests that quantity regulation will become more efficient
than price regulation as the marginal social cost curve (MSC) becomes steeper
relative to the marginal private benefit curve (MPB). Indeed, in this simple
graph, quantity regulation will be more efficient than price regulation whenever
the slope of the MSC curve is greater than (the absolute value of) the MPB
slope. Why would this be so? As discussed above, the slopes of the MSC and
MPB curves determine how sensitive effective patenting will be to shifts in
private patent benefits. When the MSC curve is relatively flat, price regulation
causes patentees to face a fee that, regardless of their private benefit, is
approximately equal to the marginal social costs of enforceable patents. Flat
MSC curves thus suggest that price regulation will be effective in inducing
levels of patenting that are relatively close to the full-information optimum.
When the MSC curve is steep, however, then shifts in the private benefits of
patenting will cause the social cost curve to substantially diverge from a fixed
renewal fee as the private benefit curve varies above or below its expected
value. When the MSC curve is steep (relative to the MSB curve), pricing
regulations will produce too great fluctuations in the level of effective patenting
as patentees look to the size of the renewal fee in deciding whether to pay to
make their patent enforceable instead of considering the diverging social costs
of enforcements.
Economists tend to think of price regulations (effluent taxations and the
like) as allowing the courts to economize on the information of private parties–
—in this case, allowing the patentees to choose the level of effective patenting
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based on their privately-known valuations. 87 But the reactions of private parties
in setting the level of effective patenting can, somewhat paradoxically, be less
well-tailored than a fixed-quantity standard that does not allow patentees’
action to vary the number of patents in effect. The fixed-pricing regulation
causes patentees to systematically overshoot in their efforts to expand or
contract the effective quantity of patents above or below the expected level.
When this overshooting effect is large enough, the fixed effective quantity of
tradable licenses can better emulate the full-information optimum than a
simple, single-price-per-period renewal system.
The analysis of Part I gives us some reason to think that quantity regulation
may in fact be more efficient than price regulation. The idea that patent systems
become more socially costly as more “thickets” emerge suggests that the
marginal social costs will likely be rising sharply. And as Figure 4 indicates,
steep MSC curves tilt the efficiency analysis toward quantity regulation.
C. Regulating Both Price and Quantity
While the foregoing graphs are sufficient to show that fixed-quantity
regulations can be more efficient than single-price regulations, it is important to
realize that government might be able to do better by adopting a regime that is
a mixture of price and quantity regulations. Specifically, the government might
make the number of licenses issued be a function of the equilibrium bids.
Instead of being a fixed vertical line, the supply of licenses might instead be an
upward sloping curve that the government sets to coincide with the net social
costs of patenting.
Graphically, the government’s task would be to fit the quantity of licenses
to the MSC curve of the previous Subparts. An upward-sloping license-supply
curve would potentially reduce the information burdens on government. Instead
of trying to assess the position of the MPB curve, the government would only
need to assess the position of the MSC curve. 88 Making the license-supply
curve equal to the external social costs of patenting would, in theory at least,
cause patentees to internalize the total costs and benefits of creating an
enforceable patent. 89 The patentees would receive the private benefits of an
87. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 84, at 14 (noting that corrective taxes
leave control decisions to individual firms); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules
Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 725 (1996) (pointing
out that liability rules allow the state to harness the information of private parties).
88. However, the government would need to assess a longer span of the MSC curve
instead of just assessing the local point at which the MSC and MPB curves intersect. There
may be circumstances in which the latter assessment might be easier. See Richard R.W.
Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and Liability Rules: Broken
Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 267, 284-99 (2002) (developing a framework
for choosing between property rules and liability rules).
89. A similar point was made by Ryan Lampe and Anthony Niblett, The Economics of
Patent Design: A Selective Survey 19 (Intellectual Prop. Research Inst. of Austl., Working
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enforceable patent if they went forward, and they would have to pay a price to
procure the license that would emulate what would otherwise be the external
social costs of patenting. If the license-supply curve were simply the MSC
curve, then the patentees would only purchase a license if the marginal benefit
to themselves individually was greater than the marginal cost to society.
Of course, to assess the schedule of increasing social costs of additional
patents is far from an easy task. But this Subpart suggests that relying simply
on price regulations, to the exclusion of quantity and quantity/price regulations,
artificially constrains the toolkit of intellectual-property policymakers.
III. HOW MIGHT A TRADABLE LICENSE SCHEME BE IMPLEMENTED?
This Part describes in a bit more detail how a system of tradable licenses
might be implemented. For simplicity, imagine that the system would only
apply to newly-issued patents, so that previously-issued patents would be
governed by the pre-existing maintenance-fee system. Licenses would be
described by two variables: a particular patent-issue year (e.g., 2010) and the
time period of the patent’s life that is covered (e.g., years 5 to 8). Thus, a
2010/years 5-8 license would cover only the years 5 to 8 of patents issued in
2010. To keep things similar to the current U.S. patent system, patentees will
be required to purchase licenses every 4 years to preserve the effectiveness of
their patents. The initial patent fees would make the patent in force for year 0 to
4. To keep a patent in force after the initial 4 years, a patentee would have to
obtain ownership of a year 5 to 8 license for their particular patent issue-year.
Afterward, a patentee who wants to keep a patent in force will need to obtain
licenses for years 9 through 12, 13 through 16, and 17 through 20. (The current
maintenance-fee system only requires patentees to purchases extended length in
years 4, 8, and 12—but because of our concerns with the thicket problem, we
would require relicensing in year 16 as well.) As with renewal fees, failure to
acquire a license at the start of any particular four-year term would render the
patent ineffective in all future years.
At the beginning of an issuance year, the USPTO would auction a
predetermined number of licenses covering the various periods of patent life for
all patents being issued that year. We imagine that the auction would be a
sealed-bid auction, similar to the type used for the Environmental Protection
Agency’s annual SO2 allowance auction. 90 For example, at the beginning of
Paper No. 06/03, 2003) (“This policy has been introduced (in part) to prevent inefficient use
of the patent system. In order to ensure optimality, the patent renewal fee at time t should
equal the marginal social cost at time t.”).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 7651o(d)(2) (2000). In order to comply with the cap on the level of
air-polluting emissions established by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990), the EPA distributed allowances to certain industries that
limited how much they could pollute; each allowance permitted the industry to emit a certain
unit of air pollution. A small proportion of allowances were reserved by the EPA and sold at
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2010, the USPTO would issue a certain number of 2010/5 licenses (granting
protection for patents issued in 2010 for years 5 to 8 of the patent’s life), a
smaller number of 2010/9 licenses, an even smaller number of 2010/13
licenses, and a yet smaller number of 2010/17 licenses. The decreasing supply
of licenses for each patent cohort suggests a kind of musical chairs in which
some of the potentially enforceable patents will necessarily become
unenforceable.
Anyone would be able to buy these licenses initially, and the licenses
would be freely alienable in a secondary market. The official owner of record
would be maintained by the USPTO. There would be no requirement that
owners be patentees of patents issued in the relevant year. But if an owner
wanted to use a license to make a particular patent enforceable for a particular
time period, the owner would have to designate to the USPTO a particular
license as applying to a particular patent.
In the last twenty years, the number of patents issued by the USPTO has
been increasing at about a 4.6% rate. In 2000, the USPTO issued 157,495
utility patents. To replicate the same decay in enforceability that is occurring
under the current system of maintenance fees, we might initially issue:

No. of auctioned licenses

2010/5
132,000

2010/9
99,000

2010/13
73,000

2010/17
56,000

The first three figures are taken by looking at the rate of patent expiration
that occurred in 1991 91 and applying it (before rounding to the nearest
thousand) to the initial level of patenting in 2000 (157,495 patents). The fourth
figure for the number of 2010/17 licenses was calculated by continuing the
same (geometric) average rate of decay.
Now that we have specified with a bit more particularity how a tradable
licensing system would operate (at least) initially, we can say a bit more about
the benefits that might accrue under such a system. As we said before, tradable
licenses would offer more flexibility than the current system. Patentees could,
at the time of patenting, secure all the licenses that they would need to keep
an annual sealed-bid auction. See generally Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work:
An Analysis of the Utility Sector’s Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur
Dioxide Under the Clean Air Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001). The precise mechanism of
the SO2 auction has been described in the following way:
Interested parties submit bids indicating the number of allowances they seek to purchase and
the price they are willing to pay. The Chicago Board of Trade [which the EPA has designated
to run the auction] determines the price that would lead to the sale of all the available
allowances. All bids at or above that price are then accepted, with each successful bidder
paying the amount it bid.

Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing Marketable
Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 658
(2001).
91. See Moore, supra note 57, at 1527-31.
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their patent in force for the full twenty-year term. This could, in a small way,
save on the current transaction cost of having to remember to pay your
maintenance fee. Alternatively, patentees could wait and see if the value of
their patent and the value of the licenses in the secondary market make
continued enforcement worthwhile. Tradable licenses let assets flow to the
highest valuers—in sharp contrast to maintenance fees, which are not tradable.
Thus, a system that simply tried to replicate the rate of expiration under the
current maintenance-fee system might be more efficient.
But we think that even more gains in efficiency can be achieved by
gradually increasing the amount of weeding that takes place. And here the
annual growth rate in issuing patents of about 5% comes to our aid. Simply
maintaining any fixed level of issued licensing will gradually become more and
more restrictive as the number of newly-issued patents increases. We need to
consider how much more we should let the rate of licensing bind before it
should adjust to accommodate the growing rate of patenting.
Quantitatively tailoring the patent system is the Herculean burden. Ever
since Nordhaus, 92 economists have been able to produce theories about, but
precious few numbers on, the optimal length (or breadth) of patents. In theory,
we know we want to weed until the marginal cost of a license equals the
marginal social cost of patenting, but we do not yet know how to measure the
marginal social cost. 93 A scheme of tradable licenses, however, gives us more
information about the marginal patent. The USPTO will get to see the market
price for the fifth, ninth, thirteenth, and seventeenth year licenses for each
cohort. The license prices themselves (both in the auction and in the secondary
market) will provide some information about what kinds of inventions are
being deterred. For example, if the year five license price rises to seven figures,
we are probably weeding too much because patentees will not find it
92. WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969) (discussing the optimal patent system). For
subsequent studies of the issue of patent scope, see, for example, Howard F. Chang, Patent
Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 34 (1995); Julie E.
Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 1 (2001); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21
RAND J. ECON. 106 (1990); Hugo A. Hopenhayn & Matthew F. Mitchell, Innovation
Variety and Patent Breadth, 32 RAND J. ECON. 152 (2001); Paul Klemperer, How Broad
Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113 (1990); Robert P. Merges
& Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839
(1990).
93. See, e.g., FRITZ MACHLUP, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85th CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (“If we did not have a patent system, it would be
irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to
recommend instituting one.”); George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About
Intellectual Property: Comment on Cheung, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE
ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 19, 19 (John Palmer & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. eds.,
1986) (“The ratio of empirical demonstration to assumption in [the patent] literature must be
very close to zero.”).
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worthwhile to invent many useful things if they expect to pay more than a
million dollars to keep their inventions alive after just four years. But beyond
just the price information, the USPTO will be able to observe the identity of
patents that are not extended. If the owners of socially valuable patents do not
find it worthwhile to extend their patents’ lives, policymakers should worry
about whether similar future inventions will even come into being.
Finally, a word is in order about the possibility that non-patent owners will
purchase the licenses solely for the purpose of reducing the number of patents
that can be legally enforced. Remember that, under our scheme, the USPTO
places no requirement that licenses purchasers be patent owners at the time of
purchase or that they use the licenses to make actual patents enforceable. This
means that Larry Lessig or the Free Software Foundation might purchase
licenses just to expand the intellectual commons. Just as third graders and other
environmentalists sometimes purchase SO2 licenses to “park” them and reduce
the amount of pollution, intellectual property communitarians would be free to
purchase patent licenses so as to exacerbate the musical chairs shortage.
This is, all in all, a good thing. Such “parking” not only democratizes the
effective supply of patent enforcement—it also increases efficiency. If a third
grade class believes that it values a 2020/5 license more than the marginal
patent owner, then efficiency is enhanced by letting the license flow to the
highest valuer.
On the other hand, efficiency would not be enhanced if the end users of a
patented product purchased a license only so that the particular patentee would
not be able to enforce its patent, charge the end user, and thereby earn a return
on its innovative effort. But it should be emphasized that the licenses are not
tied to particular patents, so an end user would not be able to purchase the right
to stop a particular patentee from charging a monopoly price unless she
purchased all the available licenses for that patent-issuance year. Such an
undergoing would, of course, be a prohibitively expensive means for an end
user to protect herself from a patentee’s monopoly pricing. More generally, we
believe that, as with other broadly available commodities, “cornering the
market” risks are low. But they could be handled with regulations that parallel
the market-manipulation prohibitions of the security markets.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we explored how price- and quantity-based regulation of
patents may help overcome patent thickets and clear the path for future
innovation. The main innovation of the Article itself was to introduce the
option of tradable patent rights as a policy tool for combating overpatenting.
Admittedly, the analysis leaves many important questions open. Should we
weed progressively more over the life of a patent cohort, or should we weed
more assiduously at the beginning of a cohort’s life? Should we weed with
price, quantities, or some combination of prices and quantities? Can price or

894

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:863

quantity regulations weed out socially costly patents without unduly burdening
patents that are on net socially beneficial?
Nevertheless, we hope to have at least shown that policymakers have an
array of weeding tools that go well beyond simply increasing the initial
standards for non-obviousness. Price and quantity regulations deserve to be
among the policymaker’s gardening implements as they open up new
possibilities for economizing on patentees’ private information throughout the
life of the patent.

